1.
AxLysis or H.R.-12S89, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (193t, ) ; H.R. -.'o. 14fJ), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1937) ; 4 CoLLiER, BA.NR nvrrcy 103 n.1 (14th td., Mo, re, 1942 666 (1926) . In re Consolidated Iron & Steel Co., 76 F2d -37 (tth Cir. 1935) ; In re Lewis, 99 Fed. 935 (D. Mass. 1900) ; In re Wright, 95 Fed. ,u7 (D. Ma~s. 1899).
5.
See materials cited note 1 stpra. 6. Except rent priorities, which were given 5th (last) place in the federal priority scheme, and restricted to "rent which is legally due and owing for the actual ue and occupancy of the premises affected, and which accrued within three months Lbfore the date of bankruptcy." 52 STAT. 874 (1938) , 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (5) (194t)).
7. Section 67 (b) provides: "The provision of section 60... notwithstanding, statutory liens . . . may be valid against the trustee, even though arising or perfected while the debtor is insolvent and within four months prior to the filing of the petition... :' 52 STAT. 876 (1938) , as amended, 66 STr.k. 427, 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(b) (Supp. 1952 One result of postponing a lien might be to allow an unpostponed junior lien on the same property to pre-empt payment of administration expenses and small wage claims, See New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943) ; In re Empire Granite Co,, 42 F. Supp. 450 (M.D. Ga. 1942) .
12. Wage claims are restricted to the amount earned within three months prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, not to exceed $600 per claimant. Rent claims are restricted to the amount accrued within three months before the date of bankruptcy. 52 STAT. 874 (1938) , 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1946) .
Restriction aims at protection of general creditors from exhaustion of the bankrupt's estate. ANALYSIS 
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[Vol. 62 NOTES ordinary claimant will share with general creditors after all 64a priorities are paid. And even if subordinated lienors themselves are entitled to a 64a priority, they would, with the exception of wage claimants (who possess a second priority anyway), 13 receive a higher rank in the order of payment. By virtue of their subordinated liens, landlords, otherwise usually entitled to a fifth priority, 14 take precedence over the third priority (creditors' expenses of proving the debtor's misconduct in the bankruptcy proceedings) 1 5 and the fourth priority (tax% claims).1 This elevation may enhance the claimant's chances of recovery since tax claims often take a large bite of the debtor's remaining assets.
17 Tax claims, normally accorded a fourth priority in the absence of a lien, rise above the third priority too. This jump itself is likely to be inconsequential because of the typically low claims of the third priority.' s But the amount allowed on the tax claims may be increased, the fourth priority specifying that "no order shall be made for the payment of a tax assessed against any property of the bankrupt in excess of the value of the interest of the bankrupt estate therein" is interpreted by some ctsurts to mean that the excess of a tax claim should not even be allowed as a general claim.' 9 Since 67c contains no similar proscription, the excess of a suhordinated tax lien might be paid as a general claim.
In 1952, Congress again critically considered state statutory liens and restricted them further.
20 Former 67c became 6 7 c(1) and subdivision (2) was added, which provides that: Even with the restrictive effect of the 1952 amendment, Section 67c remains an imperfect implementation of Congress' desire to preserve the Bankruptcy Act's order of payment. Section 67c still appplies only to statutory liens on personalty; yet statutory liens on realty may constitute a greater threat to the Act's payment scheme since they probably consume a larger share of the bankrupt's estate. 23 Moreover, holders of statutory liens on personalty may continue to disrupt the hierarchy of payment. Statutory lienors can escape 67c completely by foreclosing their liens prior to bankruptcy, or, with the exception of landlords with a lien of distress for rent, by obtaining possession of the encumbered property; and while the federal government as tax lienor qualifies for 67c(1) without taking any steps to protect its lien, state statutory lienors can come under 67c(1) by acquiring a levy, sequestration, or distraint.
21. 66 STAT. 427, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (2) (Supp. 1952).
State statutory liens of distress for rent:
From an independent reading of the two subdivisions, 67(c) (1) would apply to all state statutory liens of distress for rent. Yct 67(c) (2) covers some of the same ground, since it applies to state statutory liens of distress for rent not accompanied by possession, levy, sequestration, or distraint. A harinoiou interpretation of the subdivisions requires 67(c) (1) to be read as applicable, not to all state statutory liens of distress for rent, but only to those accompanied by either possession, levy, sequestration, or distraint: all others fall under 67(c) (2).
State statutory non-rent lics: While both subdivisions apply to non-rent state statutory liens only when the lienor has no possession, 67(c) (2) does not come into play unless the lienor also lacks levy, sequestration, or distraint. On a literal reading of the statute, 67(c) (1) would seem to apply to liens that fall under 67(c) (2), since such liens would not be accompanied by possession. To avoid this, the subdivision must be read so that .1134
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NOTES
But 67c(2) may have been enacted to encourage statutory lienors to give public notice of the existence of their liens, in order to prevent extension of credit on encumbered property by unsuspecting creditors.
2 4 This goal, however, is incompatible with the section's primary objective. To the extent creditors receive public notice through possession, levy, sequestration, or distraint, the Act's hierarchy of payrnent will be upset: maximum attainment of the notoriety aim will cause maximum interference with the Act's payment scheme. Aside from this incompatibility of aims, the section's ability to promote notoriety of liens is probably limited. Since the section is restricted to liens on personalty, 67c(2) does not encourage public notice of realty liens. In fact, 67b may allow perfection of realty liens after bankruptcy if the state statutory period for perfection has not elapsed. 25 Moreover, even as to statutory liens on personalty, 67c ignores public notice by recordation. Some states allow or require perfection in this way3 And recordation, especially in states where it is the required method of perfection, might provide more effective notice than possession, levy, sequestration, or distraint.
The increasing antipathy toward statutory liens on personalty, evidenced by the 1938 and 1952 amendments to the Act, may signal a trend toward complete withdrawal of protection for such liens in bankruptcy proceedings. Such a goal seems eminently desirable. The Act now offers 64a priorities to groups that are generally thought to merit special consideration: wage earners, landlords, state and federal taxing authorities. Congress could enact additional priorities if other creditors were thought deserving of special treat- Cir. 1944) . The 1952 House of Representatives Committee Report hints that notice was intended; and to explain why liens on realty were not made subject to 67(c), it states: "A lien upon real estate is commonly dealt with adequately by recording acts .. " H.R. REin. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952) . Since the primary function of recording is notice, this implies that notice was a goal of 67(c).
(2d
It is possible that notice was not an objective of the Chandler Act, and that the notion was voiced in the cases by judges who, in other situations, were accustomed to viewing possession as a means of giving notice. 
